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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:

v.

:

BRADLEY C. DAVIS, and
HOLLY H. HYATT,

:

Case No. 960271-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendants/Respondents.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
1.

Should this Court have reached and resolved against the

State an issue that defendant's failed to brief?
2.

Did this Court correctly conclude that the facts of the

case required the probation officers to determine the Escort's
ownership before searching it?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an amended information, the State charged defendant Davis
with possession of methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana with
the intent to distribute (Counts I through III respectively)/
possession of drug paraphernalia (Count IV); and possession of
stolen property (Count V) (Davis R. at 65-64, 224).

The State

charged defendant Hyatt with possession of methamphetamine (Count

The trial court did not number defendants' pleadings files
separately. Therefore, the State will identify references to
Davis's pleading file as "Davis R." and references to Hyatt's as
"Hyatt R."
1

I) and possession of drug paraphernalia (Count II) (Hyatt R. at
2-1) .
Prior to trial, defendants moved to suppress all of the
physical evidence seized during the search of their residence and
automobiles (Davis R. at 97, 105; Hyatt R. at 72, 80). After two
evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied the motion except as
to items found in a black bag after the searching officer
determined that the bag belonged to defendant Hyatt (Davis R. at
126-25; Hyatt R. at 99-98).

At the conclusion of each hearing,

the trial court made detailed oral findings and conclusions
denying defendants' motion (Tr. September 5, 1995 at 130-35; Tr.
October 2, 1995 at 280-88) .

Transcript pages 130-35 and 280-88

are attached as addendum B.

The trial court also entered

detailed written findings of fact and conclusions of law (Davis
R. at 137-29; Hyatt R. at 110-102).

A copy of the written

findings and conclusions is attached as addendum C.
The jury convicted both defendants as charged (Davis R. at
270-69; Hyatt R. at 198).

Both defendants timely filed their

notices of appeal (Davis R. at 312; Hyatt R. at 262).
This Court reversed part of the denial of defendants'
suppression motion.

State v. Davis, slip op. 960271-CA at 7-14

(Utah App. August 6, 1998).
addendum A.

A copy of the opinion is attached as

According to this Court, the probation officers did

not have access to sufficient facts to support a reasonable
belief that Davis had common authority over the blue Ford Escort
that belonged to Hyatt and erroneously failed to inquire about
2

the car's ownership before searching it.

Id.

This petition for

rehearing concerns only that holding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State relies on its statement of facts in the
Replacement Brief of Appellee.

The argument sections contain

discussions of the facts relevant to this petition.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT CONTRADICTED CONTROLLING CASE LAW BY
REACHING AND RESOLVING AGAINST THE STATE AN ISSUE THAT
DEFENDANTS NEVER BRIEFED
This Court reversed the denial of defendants' suppression
motion as to the items seized from the Escort.
slip op. 960271-CA at 7-14

State v. Davis,

(Utah App. August 6, 1998).

The Court

based its reversal on the State's failure to meet its burden to
establish that Davis had common authority over the Escort.

Id.

at 10-11.
The Court's holding reaches an issue that defendants failed
to brief, and that the State, in reliance on that failure, also
did not brief.

That action violates well-established precedent

precluding the Court from reaching the merits of issues that the
State has not had an opportunity to brief.
In their brief, defendants argued only that, because Hyatt
was not on probation, the probation officers could search "her
possessions and residence" only if they had probable cause, a
warrant, or consent.

Appellant's Brief at 16-17.

They went on

to argue that, as a result, the entire search was invalid as to
3

Hyatt, and that the State could not properly use any of the
evidence seized against her because the probation officers
conducted the search without a warrant or probable cause.

Id.

The evidence in this case clearly established that Hyatt had no
exclusive control over the residence; therefore, defendants
effectively argued that she had a fully protected expectation of
privacy over all the areas to which she had authority, regardless
of whether Davis also had authority over those areas.
Moreover, the trial court specifically found that Davis had
common authority over the Escort (Davis R. at 132). A copy of
the findings and conclusions is attached as addendum B.
Defendants never even acknowledged, let alone challenged this
finding.
In compliance with precedent, the State responded only to
the arguments defendants made.

The State correctly argued that,

under the controlling law, Hyatt had a reduced expectation of
privacy in and impliedly consented to searches of all areas over
which she and Davis, a probationer, had common authority.

See

State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073-74 (Utah 1987) (applying
the principle to persons living with parolees).

The State

further pointed out that defendants had never addressed the
critical issue of common authority and that their failure to
address this critical issue defeated their claim.2

The State

could justifiably rely on defendants' failure to brief the

"The Court misstates that the parties framed Davis's common
authority over the Escort as the "pivotal question." Id. at 8.
4

critical issue as a basis for rejecting the argument without
briefing the merits.

See, e.g., State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,

1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of the
defendant's state constitutional challenge because defendant
failed to provide any supporting legal analysis or authority).
However, when this Court addressed the merits of whether
Davis had common authority over the Escort, it improperly
deprived the State of an opportunity to brief that issue.

In

State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court
refused to reach a state constitutional issue that Brown raised
for the first time in his reply brief.

Id. at 855 n.l.

The

Court held:
If we were to review Brown's state constitutional
analysis under those circumstances, he would be
rewarded for his omission and given the opportunity to
present an unopposed analysis. The State would be
placed in the difficult position in future cases of
either missing the opportunity to brief the state
constitutional law issue or having to construct and
then rebut the unbriefed issue.
Id.

Despite this rule, the Court has resolved an issue against

the State without giving the State an opportunity to brief its
merits.

The Court has placed the State in the "difficult

position" in future cases of identifying and addressing not only
the issues raised in defendants' briefs, but also any unbriefed
issues that the Court might reach on its own.
The Court states that it appropriately reached the issue of
common authority because: 1) it is critical to determining
whether the probation officers could legally search the Escort;
and 2) the parties discussed it at oral argument.
5

Neither

rationale justifies reaching the merits of an unbriefed issue.
First, defendants' failure to brief the critical issue waived the
claim; it did not justify this Court reaching its merits.
Second, answering questions about an unbriefed issue at oral
argument cannot substitute for briefing: it deprives the State of
the opportunity to research the issue.
POINT II
ALTERNATIVELY, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE
PROBATION OFFICERS HAD NO DUTY TO DETERMINE WHO OWNED
AND USED THE BLUE ESCORT BEFORE SEARCHING IT, AND THIS
COURT'S CONCLUSION TO THE CONTRARY IS INCORRECT3
This Court found that the trial court should have granted
the motion to suppress as to all of the items found in the blue
Ford Escort.

State v. Davis, slip op. 960271 at 7-14

August 6, 1998) .

(Utah App.

The Court held that, under the facts of this

case, the probation officers had a duty to inquire about the
Escort's ownership before searching it.

Id.

Prior to this case, no Utah case has articulated the
standard for determining whether a probationer or parolee had
common authority over the area searched.

However, other

jurisdictions hold that officers may search all areas over which
they reasonably suspect or believe that the probationer has
common authority or control.
932 F.2d 752, 758 (9

See, e.g., United States v. Davis,

Cir. 1991) (police must have reasonable

"The State does not intend this argument to address the
issue fully. If this Court denies the petition on the first
basis, but finds rehearing appropriate on the second, the State
asks for an opportunity to brief the merits of this issue
completely before the Court reaches a decision.
6

suspicion that item to be searched is owned, controlled, or
possessed by the probationer); State v. West, 517 N.W.2d 482, 491
n.15 (Wis.), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 955 (1994) (citing Illinois
v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1994)); Milton v. State, 879
P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (Alaska App. 1994) (citing Davis); People v.
Boyd, 224 Cal. App.3d 736, 745 (Cal App. 1990).

The trial court

concluded that both Davis and Hyatt had access to and control
over the Escort (R. 132).
Relying primarily on the officer's failure to inquire about
the Escort's ownership, this Court rejected that conclusion.
at 13.

Id.

The Court concluded that the officers face an "ambiguous

situation" and could have easily determined that Hyatt owned the
Escort by running the plates.

Id.

There are few probation search cases dealing with the issue
that this case presents.

However, those that do exist, including

some on which this Court relied support the opposite conclusion
from that reached by this Court.

Those with facts more analogous

to this case support concluding that, under the facts of this
case, the probation officers had no duty to determine the
Escort's ownership before searching it.
The Court relies on People v. Tidalgo, 123 Cal. App. 3d 301
(Cal. App. 1981) to support its conclusion that the officers had
an affirmative duty to establish who owned the Escort before
searching it.

Id. at 13.

To the extent that the Court relies on

Tidalgo for the proposition that officers must always determine
whether the probationer owns an item that they intend to search
7

before searching it, the Court fails to recognize that later
California cases have rejected that application of Tidalgo.
People v. Boyd, 224 Cal. App. 3d 736, 749 (Cal. App. 1990).

See

also United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d at 760 (rejecting a duty to
inquire about ownership in all instances).
Moreover, cases requiring probation officers to inquire
about ownership before searching involved circumstances that
should have put the officers on notice that the probationer or
parolee may not have common authority over the premises searched.
For example, in Tidalgo, officers found Tidalgo at a residence
where an informant told them he would be.
Cal. App. 3d at 303-304.

People v. Tidalgo, 123

When they asked Tidalgo for permission

to search the residence, he told them that he could not give his
consent because the residence belonged to his sister-in-law.
at 304.

Id.

In addition, the parole officer knew that Tidalgo stayed

at another residence and that Tidalgo's sister-in-law lived at
the home searched.

Id. at 307.

Finally, the officers found no

property belonging to defendant to suggest that he had authority
over the searched residence.

Id. at 307-308.

Similarly, in People v. Veronica, 107 Cal. App. 3d 906 (Cal.
App. 1980), parole officers searched a male parolee's female
roommate's purse.

Noting that the purse was clearly feminine,

the court of appeals concluded that there was nothing to overcome
the presumption that the purse belonged the female nonparolee.
Id. at 908-909.
By contrast, other cases have upheld searches of
8

nonprobationer's or nonparolee's property found in areas over
which a probationer had apparent authority and nothing
affirmatively suggested that the probation did not have common
authority over the searched item.

For example, in United States

v, Davis, a nonprobationer challenged the search of a safe in the
probationer's apartment, contending that the probationer did not
have common authority over the safe.

The Ninth circuit

acknowledged that police opened the safe with a combination found
on the nonprobationer.

United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d at 759.

Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the probation
officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the probationer
had common authority over the safe because it appeared that the
probationer and nonprobationer were engaged in a joint drug
enterprise, they found drugs and drug paraphernalia in the common
areas of the house, and the safe was in the probationer's
apartment.

Id.

Similarly, in People v. Palmquist, 123 Cal. App. 3d 1 (Cal
App. 1981), parole officers searched a refrigerator in the
apartment that the parolee shared with his nonparolee girlfriend.
Id. at 7.

The court of appeals concluded that facts establishing

that the parolee lived in the apartment were sufficient to
establish that he had common authority over the refrigerator.
Id. at 13.

See also People v. Boyd, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 750

(parole officers reasonably searched female nonparolee's handbag
that appeared gender neutral and was found in trailer jointly
controlled by parolee and nonparolee).
9

The facts in this case more closely parallel those finding
that probation or parole officers reasonably believed that the
probationer had common authority over the area searched.

At the

time of the search, Davis owned the searched residence and Hyatt
had lived there for three years (Tr. October 2, 1995 at 252-53).
There were several cars parked on the property, including the
Escort (id. at 214). The Escort did not appear to belong to a
visitor: officers said that it had dust on the dashboard;

was

buried in snow; and did not appear operable (id. at 214).
Officers expanded the search to include a "more concentrated
search" of the cars and outbuildings when Hyatt told them that
the house should contain no controlled substances because she had
told Davis to get them out of the house (id. at 223).

Nothing

about the Escort's appearance suggested that it was uniquely
Hyatt's property.

Like the refrigerator in Palmquist, the

handbag in Boyd, and the safe in Davis, officers found the car on
jointly controlled property and nothing about its appearance
suggested that it belonged only to Hyatt.

Similarly, Hyatt never

asserted that the car belonged only to her and that defendant had
no control over it.

Therefore, the officers could reasonably

conclude that Davis had common authority over Escort.
In short, this Court incorrectly concluded that the officers
had a duty to inquire about the Escort's ownership before
searching.

Under the circumstances of this case, it appeared

that Davis had common authority over the Escort and nothing
affirmatively suggested the contrary.
10

CONCLUSION
The State asks that the Court affirm the denial of the
suppression motion as to the items seized from the Escort for
failure to brief the critical issue.

Alternatively, if the Court

still determines that it should reach the issue, the State asks
for an opportunity to brief it more fully before considering the
issue on its merits.
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As required by rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
b t a t e of Utah,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

P l a i n t i f f and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 961271-CA

Bradley C. Davis and Holly H.
Hyatt,

F I L E D
(August 6, 1998)

Defendants and Appellants.

Fifth District, Cedar City Department
The Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite
Attorneys:

D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Jan Graham and Thomas B. Brunker, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
Defendant Bradley "Chick" Davis appeals his convictions for
possession of cocaine and methamphetamine with intent to
distribute, both second degree
felonies, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998) -,1 possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998); possession of drug paraphernalia, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998) ;
and possession of stolen property, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (1995) and 76-6-412
(Supp. 1997) . Defendant Holly H. Hyatt appeals her convictions
for possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998), and possession of
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). We affirm in part and reverse in
part.

1. As a convenience to the reader, and because the provisions in
effect at the relevant times do not differ materially from the
statutory provisions currently in effect, we cite to the most
recent statutory codifications throughout this opinion, unless
otherwise noted.

FACTS
The events which led to the convictions from which
defendants appeal began on November 15, 1994. Defendant Davis
was then on probation under the terms of an agreement which
included the usual proscriptions against possessing firearms,
possessing or using controlled substances, knowingly associating
with persons involved in criminal activity, and engaging in
criminal activity. On November 15, Utah Adult Probation and
Parole Officers Robert Eckman and Rod Seymour visited Davis at
his Cedar City home, where Davis lived with defendant Hyatt. The
officers conducted a search which led to the discovery of drug
paraphernalia and a firearm. The incriminating items were found
in Davis's bedroom and in a tan van he had been driving. Also,
Davis admitted to the officers that he had used both marijuana
and methamphetamine during the prior week. The officers arrested
Davis and placed him on a seventy-two-hour hold, after which he
was released.
Five days later, on November 20, 1994, Division of Wildlife
Resources Officer Gary A. McKell was called to assist a Hurricane
City Police Officer, who had stopped a vehicle occupied by Mark
Milby and Kelly Blackburn. The two were found with drugs and
paraphernalia. Milby was arrested and Blackburn was cited and
released. Officer McKell was called because the Hurricane
officer found deer blood and hair in the back of Milby's vehicle
and on a knife and gloves. Officer McKell, thinking that a
poached deer and drug activity might just be found at the Milby
residence in Summit, Utah, contacted Sergeant Rick Evans of the
Iron County Sheriff's Department and asked him to watch the
residence.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. the following morning, close to
the end of his shift, Sergeant Evans drove to Milby's house.
Evans observed that all of the lights were on and that
Blackburn's truck was idling in front. Evans decided to wait and
watch. About ten minutes later, he saw someone in a tan van
approach, veer as if to turn into Milby's driveway, but then
change course upon seeing Evan's patrol car. Instead of pulling
into the Milby driveway, the van driver drove off down the
street. Suspicious, Sergeant Evans followed the van for a short
distance to the Summit Truck Stop, where he parked behind the van
but sufficiently to its side that the driver could have backed
out without hitting Evans's patrol car.
Both Evans and the driver of the van exited their vehicles
and Evans approached and asked the driver who he was and what he
was doing. The driver of the van identified himself as Chick
Davis and told Sergeant Evans that he sometimes drove around at
night to take his mind off his son's recent death. During this
encounter, Evans had not used his overhead lights, had not
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ordered Davis out of the van, did not ask to see Davis's driver's
license or registration, and never came within touching distance
of Davis.
After hearing Davis's explanation, Sergeant Evans left the
Summit Truck Stop and was returning the way he came when he
passed Blackburn, who was headed towards the truck stop. Evans
turned and followed Blackburn to the truck stop, where he saw
Blackburn park next to Davis's van, go into the diner, and sit
down with Davis. Later that day, Sergeant Evans contacted
probation officers Eckman and Seymour and told them what he had
seen. Based upon this information, their discovery of Davis's
probation violations several days earlier, and their personal
familiarity with Milby and his involvement with drugs, Eckman and
Seymour, suspicious that Davis was again violating his probation,
decided to again search the Davis and Hyatt residence.
On November 21, 1994, Eckman and Seymour, joined by other
officers, conducted a warrantless probation search of the house
shared by Davis and Hyatt, a nearby shed, and several vehicles
parked on the property--including the tan van which they had
searched four days earlier and which Sergeant Evans saw Davis
driving earlier that morning. In addition to the van, there was
a blue Ford Escort, a black Chevrolet Camaro, a red pickup truck,
a white Chevrolet Blazer, and a camper-trailer on the property.
The officers did not check the registration on any of the
vehicles or otherwise obtain registration information before
searching them, nor did they ask Davis or Hyatt who owned or used
the vehicles. In the van, the officers discovered paraphernalia
and marijuana; in the Escort, the officers discovered a blue
diaper bag which contained methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine,
and paraphernalia; and in the house, the officers discovered a
set of double-beam scales under a bed. Additionally, in the shed
behind the house, officers found a staple gun marked "Goer," the
partial name of a local company, Goer Manufacturing, and a
router, later alleged to be stolen from Middlet on Timber, another
local business.
The State subsequently charged Davis with possession of
methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana with intent to
distribute; possession of drug paraphernalia; and possession of
stolen property. The State charged Hyatt with possession of
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The
defendants filed motions to suppress, arguing that the search was
not supported by reasonable suspicion, and that, with respect to
Hyatt, the search was not supported by a warrant or probable
cause. A suppression hearing was held on September 5 and October
2, 1995, after which the trial court denied the motions. At the
conclusion of trial, held on December 7 and 8, 1995, a jury
convicted the defendants on all counts.

961271-CA
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ISSUES
Defendants raise four principal arguments on appeal. First,
defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their
motions to suppress the evidence seized during the November 21
probation search because the search was not supported by
reasonable suspicion, as required under Davis's probation
agreement and Utah law. Second, defendants claim that, because
the search was not supported by a warrant nor any exception to
the warrant requirement, the trial court erred by failing to
suppress the evidence found in nonprobationer Hyatt's blue
Escort. Third, Davis argues that there was insufficient evidence
to convict him of possession of stolen property and therefore the
trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge. Fourth,
Davis argues that the trial court improperly admitted two State
witnesses' testimony regarding prior drug purchases from Davis
and Hyatt.
REASONABLE SUSPICION
Defendants argue that the November 21 search of their home
and property was not supported by a reasonable articulable
suspicion that Davis had violated his probation as required by
Davis's probation agreement and Utah law. They therefore contend
that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress
the evidence seized during the allegedly illegal search.
We review a trial judge's decision regarding whether the
facts of a particular case give rise to a reasonable suspicion
nondeferentially, for correctness. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d
932, 939 (Utah 1994). We must nonetheless afford trial judges "a
measure of discretion" in applying the reasonable suspicion
standard. Id.
"It is abundantly clear that probationers 'do not enjoy "the
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only
. . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of
special [probation] restrictions."'" State v. Martinez. 811 P.2d
205, 209 (Utah Ct. App.) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 U.S.
868, 874, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3168 (1987) (citation omitted;
alteration in original), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
This conditional liberty necessarily arises from the need to
balance the individual interests of probationers against the
needs of government and society. See generally Griffin. 4 83 U.S.
at 873-75, 107 S. Ct. at 3168-69; State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d
1254, 1258-59 (Utah 1983); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure
§ 10.10(c), at 766-775 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing "administrative
search" or "balancing theory" for parolee and probationer
searches). Searches directed at probationers are therefore an
exception to the usual warrant and probable cause requirements
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under the state and federal constitutions.
at 873-74, 107 S. Ct. at 3168.

See Griffin, 483 U.S.

Though a warrant based on probable cause is not required for
a probation search, "the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires that a probation officer have reasonable
suspicion before commencing a warrantless search of a
probationer's residence." State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996) .2 This reasonable suspicion requirement is echoed
by a provision of Davis's probation agreement, wherein Davis
consented to searches of his "person, residence, vehicle or any
other property under [his] control, without a warrant, at any
time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion to ensure
compliance with the conditions of [his] Probation Agreement."
Defendants contend that reasonable suspicion was lacking and that
therefore the trial court abused its discretion in denying their
motions to suppress all evidence seized during the search.
We apply a two-part test to warrantless probation searches:
"[T]o constitute a valid warrantless search, there must be
evidence (1) that the [probation] officer has a reasonable
suspicion that the [probationer] has committed a [probation]
violation or crime, and (2) that the search is reasonably related
to the [probation] officer's duty." State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d
1069, 1072 (Utah 1987) .
In applying the first part of this test, we note that
"'reasonable suspicion requires no more than that the authority
acting be able to point to specific and articulable facts that,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant a belief . . . that a condition of
[probation] has been or is being violated.'" Velasquez. 672 P.2d
at 1260 n.5 (quoting United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 35 (5th
Cir. 1982)). Accord Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1072. However, a
probation search "'cannot be based upon a mere hunch without
factual basis, nor upon "casual rumor, general reputation, or
mere whim."'" Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1262 (citations omitted).
To determine whether the facts known to the officers legitimately
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion, we do not address each fact
2. This court has noted that the reasonable suspicion standard
applies to searches of both probationers and parolees. See State
v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209-10 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). See also United States v. Davis. 932
F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We do not believe the distinction
between the status of parolee and that of a probationer is
constitutionally significant for purposes of evaluating the scope
of a search."). See generally. 4 LaFave, supra, § 10.10(c), at
767-69 (discussing searches of probationers and parolees and
noting that same concerns generally apply to both groups).
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in isolation, but instead view them in their totality.
vr Strjcfrling, 844 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

See State

Davis's probation agreement included proscriptions against
possessing firearms, possessing or using controlled substances,
knowingly associating with criminals, and engaging in criminal
activity. Violation of any one of these proscriptions
constituted a probation violation. When they searched the Davis
and Hyatt residence, the officers knew the following: Six days
before the search, Davis violated the terms of his probation by
possessing drug paraphernalia and a firearm and by using
marijuana and methamphetamine. The evening before the search,
Hurricane police arrested Milby for possessing methamphetamine
and cited Blackburn for possessing drug paraphernalia. Milby 1 s
arrest and Blackburn's citation triggered an investigation of
Milby for possible poaching and further drug activities.
Officers considered Milby to be a known drug user and a possible
dealer. A few short hours after Milby's arrest, at two o'clock
in the morning, Sergeant Evans saw Blackburn's truck idling
outside of Milby's house and saw Davis approach. Davis started
to pull into Milby's driveway, but aborted when he saw Sergeant
Evans's patrol car. A few minutes later, Evans saw Davis and
Blackburn meet at the Summit Truck Stop.
Based on the totality of the facts known to the probation
officers--and the legitimate inferences drawn from those facts-they appropriately harbored a reasonable suspicion that Davis had
violated his probation. The first part of the reasonable
suspicion test is therefore satisfied.3

3. Davis also argues that Sergeant Evans "stopped" him at the
Summit Truck Stop and that the alleged stop was not premised upon
a reasonable suspicion. We disagree. At the truck stop, Evans
pulled in behind Davis but sufficiently to the side that Davis
could back out; Evans did not activate his lights or siren; he
did not order Davis out of the van; he did not ask to see Davis's
license or registration; and he never approached within touching
distance of Davis. Rather, Evans merely asked Davis who he was
and what he was doing, and Davis raised no objection to Evans's
actions. After Davis answered Evans's two questions, Evans
promptly left. "'[A]n officer may approach a citizen at [any
time] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained
against his will. 1 " State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah
1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d
223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)). Because Evans only briefly questioned
Davis and in no way detained him against his will, the events at
the truck stop constituted a level one encounter which did not
implicate Davis's Fourth Amendment rights. Cf . id. at 618.
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The second part of the probation search test requires that
the search be reasonably related to the probation officers'
duties. This requirement "deters police officers from using
[probation] agents to evade the necessity of procuring a warrant
prior to a search." United States v. Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 362 n.3
(10th Cir. 1995) (applying Utah warrantless search test to search
of parolee's residence). See also Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1072 n.2
("A parole search is invalid if the parole officer acts merely as
an agent or tool of the police."). Here, Eckman and Seymour's
search of the Davis and Hyatt home was clearly related to the
probation officers' duties.
In Lewis, the Tenth Circuit found that a search by parole
agents of a parolee's home was reasonably related to the agents'
duties and to the "'legitimate demands of the operation of the
parol process'" because the agents were properly concerned that
the parolee was involved in drug activity and violating the terms
of his parole. 71 F.3d at 363 (quoting Velasquez, 672 P.2d at
1263). The court explained: "To adequately deter misconduct and
protect the public, parole agents must be permitted to act
expeditiously upon reasonable suspicion of a parole violation."
Id. The same is true here: The warrantless search of the Davis
and Hyatt home was reasonably related to the probation officers'
duties to protect the public and prevent Davis from violating his
probation. Thus, like the first, the second part of the
probation-search test is satisfied, and we therefore conclude
that the trial court did not err in denying the defendants'
motions to suppress on this basis.
SEARCH OF HYATT'S ESCORT
Defendants contend that the blue Escort, which was
registered in Hyatt's name only, was not property over which
Davis had common authority or control, and therefore the officers
needed more than a reasonable suspicion to search it. In
response, the State argues that, because she lived with
probationer Davis, Hyatt shared his reduced expectation of
privacy and that she impliedly consented to searches of areas
over which Davis had common authority--including the blue Escort.
Before turning to the merits of these contentions, we pause
briefly to address the dissent's suggestion that this issue is
not properly before us on appeal. At the outset, we note that
Davis's common authority over the Escort was central to the
arguments below, both at the suppression hearing and at trial.
At the end of the suppression hearing, the trial judge ruled from
the bench that the central issue regarding the search of Hyatt's
car was whether Davis had "access and control over" the car. The
trial court concluded that Davis had such access and control.
Moreover, in the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
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Law, and Order on defendants' motions to suppress, the trial
court found that Davis had "access to and control of the blue
Ford Escort" and that much of the contraband found during the
search was discovered "in common areas" of the home and in the
two vehicles that "both [d]efendants had access to, and control
over." Further, the trial court concluded that Hyatt had a
"reduced 'expectation of privacy'" in the residence and the
vehicles located within common areas. In appealing the trial
court's denial of their motions to suppress, the defendants
challenge these very findings and conclusions. Moreover, at
trial, substantial testimony addressed whether the officers had
reason to believe Davis had authority over or access to the
Escort, as evidenced by the several officers who testified
concerning footprints leading to the car.
The parties have not dropped these important questions on
appeal. The defendants argue in their brief that because Hyatt
was not on probation, a search of her property had to be
supported by probable cause and/or a warrant. In response, the
State argues that because Hyatt lived with a probationer, she had
a reduced expectation of privacy and that she impliedly consented
to searches of areas within Davis's common authority based only
on a reasonable suspicion. The State further contends that Hyatt
failed to show she had a fully protected expectation of privacy
in the Escort because she failed to show that it was within her
exclusive control. Both parties spent substantial time at oral
argument addressing the defendants' authority and control over
the Escort. Given these arguments, which propose differing
search standards, it is difficult to see how one could avoid
addressing the issue of Davis's authority and control over the
Escort. The issue is key to any consideration of the propriety
of the Escort search, in which much of the incriminating evidence
was found.
Thus, we respectfully disagree with the dissent's assertion
that Davis's common authority or control over the Escort is not
properly before us. Not only was the common authority issue a
primary concern below, but it is inescapable on appeal.
Accordingly, we appropriately turn our attention to these
competing arguments.
As framed by the parties, the pivotal question is whether
Davis had "common authority" over the blue Escort such that the
officers needed only a reasonable suspicion to justify the
warrantless search. "We of course defer to the trial court's
findings of the underlying facts, applying a clearly erroneous
standard, so long as the findings have adequate evidentiary
support. However, we will apply a correction of error standard
to the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion," State v. Elder,
815 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted),
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while according "a measure of discretion" to the trial court.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).
In United States v, MatlQCk, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S. Ct. 988
(1974), the United States Supreme Court explained that consent to
search can be given not only by a defendant, but also by "a third
party who possesse [s] common authority over or other sufficient
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."
Id. at 171, 94 S. Ct. at 993. Common authority to consent to a
search
rests . . . on mutual use of the property by
persons generally having joint access or
control for most purposes, so that it is
reasonable to recognize that any of the coinhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the
others have assumed the risk that one of
their number might permit the common area to
be searched.
Id. U.S. at 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct. at 993 n.7. $££. Elder, 815 P.2d
at 1343. Thus, a showing of common authority requires
"persuasive evidence of both shared use and joint access or
control." United States v. Salinas-Cano. 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th
Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original). Accord United States v.
Whitfield. 939 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 1991). When a
probationer lives with a nonprobationer, the common authority
rule pronounced in Matlock defines the permissible scope of a
probation search. See State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1074
(Utah 1987) ("[T]he Matlock doctrine applies with equal force in
parole cases."). In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court explained:
When a parolee lives with a nonparolee,
courts generally hold that the cotenancy
restricts, to some degree, the extent of a
permissible consent search. The scope of
consent impliedly given by a cotenant is
limited to those parts of the premises where
the tenants possess "common authority over or
other sufficient relationship to the premises
or effects sought to be inspected."
Id. at 1073 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S. Ct. at 993).
Accord Milton v. State. 879 P.2d 1031, 1035-36 (Alaska Ct. App.
1994) .
Thus, by accepting the terms of his probation, Davis
consented to searches of any areas of the residence over which he
had common authority with Hyatt, and the officers could premise
their search of these areas on reasonable suspicion that Davis
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had violated a condition of his probation. This was a risk Hyatt
assumed by living with Davis, a probationer. The risk Hyatt
assumed, however, was not unlimited.
Because probation searches can be based on only a reasonable
suspicion, probation searches where a probationer lives with a
nonprobationer present considerable peril to the nonprobationer's
Fourth Amendment rights. "Inasmuch as authority to search the
residence of a parolee [or probationer] extends to areas which
are jointly controlled with other occupants of the residence, the
authority to search these premises necessarily portends a massive
intrusion on the privacy interests of third persons solely
because they reside with a parolee [or probationer]." People v.
Burgener. 714 P.2d 1251, 1269 (Cal. 1986) (en banc) (citation
omitted). Cf. State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260 n.3 (Utah
1983) ("Caution would certainly suggest that a warrant be
obtained if the rights of non-parolees might be affected [by a
parole search].").
The United States Supreme Court has applied a reasonableness
standard to police conduct in search and seizure cases--a
standard which applies with equal force in probation search
cases. "[T]o satisfy the 'reasonableness' requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual
determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the
government . . . is not that they always be correct, but that
they always be reasonable." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
185-86, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990). Moreover,
[a]s with other factual determinations
bearing upon search and seizure,
determination of consent . . . must "be
judged against an objective standard: would
the facts available to the officer at the
moment . . . 'warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief'" that the consenting
party had authority over the premises?
Id. at 188-89, 110 S. Ct. at 2801 (quoting Terry v. Ohio. 392
U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).
The risk to nonprobationers' Fourth Amendment rights demands
that, when officers conduct a probation search where a
probationer lives with a nonprobationer, the facts available to
the officers must support a reasonable belief that the
probationer has at least common authority over the area searched.
Under this standard, the officers searching the Davis and Hyatt
residence were entitled to search, based upon a reasonable
suspicion of a probation violation, those areas of the property
they reasonably believed were under Davis's exclusive or common
authority or control. However, contrary to the State's argument
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on appeal, Hyatt does not bear the burden of establishing her
exclusive control over the Ford Escort. Rather, ,f[t]he State
bears the burden of proving common authority, and it must do so
by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d
851, 855 (Utah 1992). Accord Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.

ct. at 2797.

see aigp People v, Elders, 380 N.E.2d 10, 14 (ill.

App. Ct. 1978) ("It is only where the record affirmatively
establishes 'joint occupancy' or 'equal rights to possession'
that one spouse's consent to a search is binding against the
other.") (emphasis added). Moreover,
[t]he [State's] burden cannot be met if
agents, faced with an ambiguous situation,
nevertheless proceed without making further
inquiry. If the agents do not learn enough,
if the circumstances make it unclear whether
the property about to be searched is subject
to "mutual use" by the person giving consent,
"then warrantless entry is unlawful without

further inquiry."
United States v. Whitfield. 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(quoting Rodriguez. 497 U.S. at 188-89, 110 S. Ct. at 2801
(emphasis added)). Here, the State has failed to meet its
burden.
The record shows that shortly after the search team arrived
at the residence, Cedar City Police Officer Kenneth Stapley took
Hyatt from the house to his vehicle where he questioned her.
Stapley testified that he asked Hyatt if there were any
controlled substances in the house, and that Hyatt's response
was, "I don't believe so. Chick cleaned the house out a couple
of days ago. There shouldn't be anything left." Stapley took
this statement to mean that Davis, believing the residence would
be searched, removed narcotics from the home to "possibly hide
them in another location." Stapley also somehow took Hyatt's
statement to mean that Davis had merely moved drugs from the home
to other parts of the property rather than destroying them or
moving them off the property altogether. Stapley therefore
called additional officers to help search the cars and
outbuildings on the property and instructed the officers to "make
sure we don't miss any of the buildings or cars." That this was
the instruction to the searching officers was corroborated by one
officer who testified that "they wanted us to search all the
vehicles in the outside area and the sheds and around the house."
Thus, despite his failure to ascertain the scope of Davis's
authority in his discussion with Hyatt, Stapley told the officers
to search everywhere, and he included no cautionary instruction
that they should beware of areas that appeared outside of Davis's
authority. Further, one officer was asked at trial: "And was
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anybody controlling the[] movement [of the approximately eight to
ten officers at the scene], saying, 'Don't go here; don't go
there. You can go here; you can go there,' or did they say,
'Search the place'?" The officer replied: "I don't recall any
control of movement, no." Additionally, though he questioned
Hyatt, Stapley did not ask if any of the several vehicles present
belonged to her or to third parties, never asked for her consent
to search the home or any of the surrounding vehicles, and
otherwise made no attempt to determine if any areas were outside
of Davis's common authority and consequently beyond the scope of
the probation search. In fact, not one of the testifying
officers attempted to determine who owned or used the vehicles
before searching them, even though several officers only knew
Davis to drive the tan van.
It is clear from the foregoing that the officers conducted
their search of the Davis and Hyatt property without any
particular concern for areas over which Hyatt may have possessed
a reasonable expectation of privacy.4 The officers were faced
with what can only be described as an "ambiguous" situation
concerning whether Davis had common authority over the Escort.
Ses. United States v. Salinas-Cano. 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir.
1992); Whitfield, 939 F.2d at 1075. £JL, Reeves v. State. 818
P.2d 495, 503 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (concluding that
defendant's ex-wife had apparent authority to consent to search
of car as shown by officer's knowledge that she had keys, she
gave keys to police, she told them defendant had just told her to
hide car, and car was parked in front of her apartment).
The State argues that the search of the Escort was premised
on the officers' reasonable belief that Davis was using it, as
evidenced by allegedly male footprints in the snow found leading
to the car. In fact, Officer Eckman testified that "footprints
leading to the door of the car" prompted him to search the
Escort. The State's argument is unpersuasive.
4. The unlimited extent of the search is shown by the search of
Hyatt's handbag, found hanging from a bedroom door. The
searching officer testified that when he searched it, he "thought
it was Holly's" handbag. While, based on this testimony, the
trial court suppressed the evidence found in the handbag, the
officers' willingness to search property clearly belonging to
Hyatt--as well as property which may otherwise be reasonably
believed to be outside the scope of Davis's common authority-demonstrates they simply did not have the proper legal criteria
in mind in conducting this search involving the rights of a
nonprobationer. Had they been mindful of the applicable
standards, Hyatt would have been asked who owned the many cars
and who had the keys to them. The officers could also have
checked motor vehicle records for ownership information.
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First, the record offers no support for the contention that
the footprints were Davis's. At trial, witnesses testified that
many people frequented the Davis residence; eight to ten officers
were at the scene for about an hour before the Escort was
searched; no one was controlling the officers' movements around
the property; the footprints could have been male or female and
could have been made by the officers, rather than Davis; and
there were multiple sets of prints leading to the Escort.
Further, the fact that every vehicle on the property was searched
pursuant to Officer Stapley's instruction reinforces the
conclusion that the presence of footprints was not the
determining factor which led the officers to search the Escort.
Finally, even if it were Davis's footprints going to the Escort,
this fact alone would not establish "common authority" over the
vehicle.
We conclude that the State failed to show that the officers
knew facts which reasonably supported a belief that Davis had
common authority over the Escort. The officers did not have
enough information to determine that the Escort was within
Davis's common authority and therefore subject to search. See
Whitfield, 939 F.2d at 1074 (holding that agents could not have
reasonably believed third party had authority to consent to
search because "[t]he agents simply did not have enough
information to make that judgment"). See algQ Salinas-Cano. 959
F.2d at 866 (stating that information known to officer was
insufficient to support reasonable belief that third party had
mutual use of searched property and, therefore, authority to
consent to search of property). Rather, the only conclusion
supported by the record is that the authorities undertook a
search of the entire premises, uncircumscribed by the
consideration that a nonprobationer also lived there and likely
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in parts of the property.
111
Neither reason nor authority support the proposition that
police may conduct a general search of the private belongings of
one who lives with a [probationer].'" People v. Veronica, 166
Cal. Rptr. 109, 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (citation omitted).
As previously suggested, the officers could have easily
taken steps to avoid intruding upon Hyatt's Fourth Amendment
rights. The officers could have run the license numbers on the
vehicles to be searched and/or questioned defendants regarding
the vehicles' ownership and use. " [W]here police officers do not
know who owns or possesses a residence or item and such
information can be easily ascertained, it is incumbent upon them
to attempt to ascertain ownership in order to protect the privacy
interest of both probationer and nonprobationer." People v.
Tidalgo. 176 Cal. Rptr. 463, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (citations
omitted).
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The State has failed to meet its burden of establishing that
the Ford Escort was within the scope of Davis's common
authority.5 We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in
failing to suppress the evidence found in the Escort.
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
During the November 21 search, officers seized a staple gun
and a router from Davis's shed, believing they were stolen.
Based on this evidence, Davis was charged with possession of
stolen property. Davis argues there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of possession of stolen property under Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-6-408 (1995) and 76-6-412 (Supp. 1997) and, therefore, that
the trial court erred when it refused to dismiss the charge and
instead submitted the matter to the jury.
5. At the suppression hearing, Hyatt did testify under crossexamination that Davis had "access to" the Escort, a fact neither
side called to our attention. Nonetheless, Hyatt's unexplained
testimony does not show that Davis had "common authority" over
the vehicle. While Hyatt did testify that Davis had "access to"
the Escort, the testimony was offered in the context of crossexamination concerning how the bag of drugs got into the Escort.
Hyatt also testified that the diaper bag was hers, but that she
did not place it in the Escort and that anybody could have had
access to the bag and to the Escort. Taken in context, Hyatt's
statement does not therefore establish that Davis had the
requisite common authority over the Escort. As the Milton court
explained:
The fact that the probationer may be
physically capable of gaining access to areas
or items . . . is not decisive when
determining the scope of the authorized
search. . . .
If the law allowed a probation
officer to search any area or item that the
probationer might have gained access to,
practically everything within the house would
be subject to search. Such a result is
contrary to the established law in this area,
which requires that the probation officer
have a reasonable suspicion that the area or
item to be searched is within the "ownership,
possession, or control of the probationer."
879 P.2d at 1036 (quoting United States v. Davis. 932 F.2d 752,
760 (9th Cir. 1991)). Accordingly, in addition to access, common
authority requires a showing of "mutual use" by persons
"generally having joint access or control for most purposes."
Matlock. 415 U.S. at 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct. at 993 n.7. Accord
Salinas-Cano. 959 F.2d at 864.
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We will affirm a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss
based upon insufficient evidence "if, upon reviewing the evidence
and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we
conclude that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt." State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah
1989). Accord State v. Hill. 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986);
State v. Gr^y, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied.
860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
The elements of the crime of receiving stolen property are
as follows:
A person commits theft if he receives,
retains, or disposes of the property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or
believing that it probably has been stolen,
or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in
concealing, selling, or withholding the
property from the owner, knowing the property
to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner
of it.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (1995). See also Hill. 727 P.2d at
223 (discussing elements of possession of stolen property).
Thus, in addition to possession and intent, a necessary element
of the crime--and the only one at issue here--is that the
defendant knew the property was stolen or believed the property
was probably stolen.
Davis argues that the State presented no evidence that he
knew the staple gun and router were stolen, and therefore there
was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him, beyond a
reasonable doubt, of receiving stolen property. In particular,
Davis argues that the router was never reported stolen by its
owner and that a substantial time intervened between the alleged
theft of both tools and their later discovery in his shed.
We conclude that, based upon the evidence presented, the
jury could reasonably find that the staple-gun, marked "Goer,"
was probably stolen and that Davis would have believed it
probably was stolen. "'Knowledge or belief of the stolen
character of goods is seldom directly proved and is usually
inferred from the facts and circumstances in evidence.'" State
v. Sales. 857 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (citation
omitted). Accord State v. Neel. 493 P.2d 740, 743 (Or. Ct. App.
1972). Cf. State v. Murphy. 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980)
(plurality opinion) ("[P]roof of a defendant's intent is rarely
susceptible of direct proof and therefore the prosecution usually
must rely on a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence
to establish this element.").
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The State presented the following evidence to the jury: The
staple gun had the name "Goer" etched into it; Goer Manufacturing
was a nearby company; a Goer employee identified the staple gun
at trial as one belonging to the company; and the Goer employee
testified that Goer did not sell or give away its tools and that,
therefore, if Davis had the staple gun, it must have been stolen.
Thus, there was ample evidence that Davis did not purchase or
otherwise obtain the staple gun directly from Goer--at least not
by any legal means. The State also offered testimony from Daniel
Balduck, who stated that on several occasions prior to Davis's
November 21 arrest, he traded stolen tools to Davis in exchange
for drugs. Although Davis did not testify at trial, as was his
right, he wholly failed to offer any plausible explanation-either through testimony of other witnesses or arguments of
counsel--for why he had the staple gun.
11

[A] s a practical matter, if the attendant circumstances
suggest that a reasonably cautious or perceptive person would
have known or believed that the property was stolen, the jury may
choose to infer, absent a plausible explanation, that the
defendant had the requisite knowledge or belief." 3 Charles E.
Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 441, at 600-01 (15th ed. 1995).
We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to the
jury from which it could reasonably conclude that Davis probably
believed the staple gun was stolen. We therefore affirm Davis's
conviction with respect to the staple gun.
The router, on the other hand, is on a different footing.
The only substantial evidence presented at trial was the
testimony of the owner of Middleton Timber, who testified that in
December 1993 someone stole the router, which he identified by
the replacement chord he installed on the tool shortly after he
bought it. Unlike the staple gun, the router had no
distinguishing characteristics that would have placed Davis on
notice that the tool was probably stolen. Moreover, a
substantial period of time--about one year--intervened between
the alleged theft of the router and its discovery in Davis's
shed.6 The State offered no evidence concerning when or how
6. The time intervening between the theft and the router's
discovery significantly undermines any inference that Davis's
mere possession of the router suggests that he would have had a
reasonable belief that it was probably stolen. The situation
would be different if, for example, the router had been stolen
from Middleton the day before its discovery in Davis's shed. In
contrast, the presence of the name "Goer" on the staple gun
undercuts the significance of any intervening time between the
staple gun's theft and its discovery in Davis's shed. Regardless
of how many times the staple gun may have changed hands, the jury
(continued...)
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Davis came into possession of the router. While Balduck offered
testimony that he had traded stolen tools to defendant in
exchange for drugs, Blake Bentley, also a witness for the State,
testified that he had traded his personal tools to Davis in
exchange for drugs.
Thus, it is quite likely that Davis obtained the router by
means that would not have put him on notice that it was probably
stolen. We conclude that there was insufficient evidence to
enable the jury to reasonably conclude that Davis knew or
probably believed the router was stolen. While the trial court
erred in failing to dismiss the charge as it pertained to the
router, given our affirmance regarding the staple gun, sufficient
evidence remains to sustain Davis f s class-B misdemeanor
conviction for possession of stolen property under sections 76-6408 and -412.7
ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER TESTIMONY
At trial, Balduck testified that he had traded stolen
property to defendants in exchange for drugs and that he had
purchased drugs from defendants on several occasions. The State
next called Bentley, who testified that he bought methamphetamine
from Davis on one specific occasion in March 1995 and had also
previously traded some of his tools to Davis for drugs.
Defendants contend that Balduck and Bentley's testimony was
improperly admitted by the trial court under Rules 403 and 404(b)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The State argues that the
testimony was properly admitted. Moreover, the State contends
that defense counsel failed to object to Balduck's testimony, and
that, even if Bentley's testimony was improperly admitted, any
error was harmless given the other evidence presented.
Defendants respond that defense counsel did object to Balduck's
testimony, but that the objection is not of record because the
record was made electronically and the trial judge used the
"mute" button while the objection was made and discussed at the
6. (...continued)
could have inferred that the owner's name etched into the tool
would have placed Davis on notice that the tool was likely
stolen.
7. "Theft of property . . . shall be punishable . . . as a class
B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than
$300." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1) (d) (Supp. 1997). Given our
affirmance with respect to the staple gun and given testimony at
trial that the staple gun had value, there is sufficient evidence
to sustain Davis's possession-of-stolen-property conviction.
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bench. Defendants also contend the objection is evidenced by
later statements on the record.
"To preserve an issue for appeal, a party claiming error in
the admission of evidence must object on the record in a timely
fashion." Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.. 869 P.2d 926, 931
(Utah 1993). Accord State v. Ross. 782 P.2d 529, 532 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). £^i Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5); Utah R. Evid.
103(a)(1). Moreover, "'[t]he burden is on the parties to make
certain that the record they compile will adequately preserve
their arguments for review.'" Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc..
815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Franklin Fin.
v. New Empire Dev. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983)). "One
who fails to make a necessary objection or who fails to insure
that it is on the record is deemed to have waived the issue."
Lamb. 869 P.2d at 931. Defendants have failed to ensure that the
objection to Balduck's testimony, if in fact made, was preserved
in the record.
If defendants objected to Balduck's testimony and that
objection failed to appear of record, the appropriate course of
action was to seek to supplement the record via Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 11(h). See State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474,
478-79 n.17 (Utah 1990) ("[Utah Supreme Court Rule 11(h), the
substantially similar predecessor to current Utah R. App. P.
11(h),] envisions . . . clarification of what actually occurred
in the lower court that was excluded or omitted from the
record."); Olson. 815 P.2d at 1359. Rule 11(h) "provides a
reliable method for the reconstruction of events when the record
has failed in some limited respect." Olson. 815 P.2d at 1359.
The defendants have not sought to supplement the record, and
11
[c] ounsel' s recollection of the course of proceedings is no
substitute for a record of those proceedings." Id.8
Thus, defense counsel failed to preserve on the record any
objection to Balduck's testimony, defendants' argument was not
preserved for appeal, and we therefore decline to address it.
8. Even if defendants had tried to supplement the record, it is
far from clear that such an attempt would have been well
received. There is simply no hint in the record of the
objection. The transcript of Balduckfs examination appears
uninterrupted, the attorneys made no requests to approach the
bench, and there is otherwise no indication of either a bench
conference or the objection allegedly made by defense counsel.
Defendants claim that a later statement by the prosecutor refers
to the alleged objection made during Balduck's examination. The
prosecutor's statement, quoted by defendants in their brief, is
taken entirely out of context and can in no way be construed to
refer to the alleged objection.
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£££ State v. Qlsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(concluding that defendant "cannot rely on an alleged objection
raised in a bench conference that was not preserved on the
record").
Moreover, although defense counsel did object to the
relevancy and prejudice of Bentley's testimony, we conclude that
even if the objection is well taken, Bentley's somewhat
cumulative testimony alone does not undermine confidence in the
outcome given the similar--and far more damaging testimony-already offered by Balduck. Cf. State v. Seale. 853 P.2d 862,
874-75 (Utah) (holding that even if evidence was improperly
admitted, any error was harmless), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865,
114 S. Ct. 186 (1993); State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah
1992) (same). Consequently, even if the trial court did err in
admitting Bentley's testimony, the error was harmless in light of
the other evidence offered against defendants.
CONCLUSION
First, we conclude that the search of the Davis and Hyatt
property was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion that
Davis had violated his probation. Second, we conclude that the
search of Hyatt's Escort was unlawful because the State failed to
establish that there were facts known to the officers which
supported a reasonable belief that Davis had common authority
over the car. The trial court should have therefore suppressed
the evidence found in the Escort. Third, we conclude that,
regarding the staple gun, the State presented sufficient evidence
to the jury from which it could reasonably conclude Davis was
guilty of receiving stolen property. However, regarding the
router, we conclude that the State presented insufficient
evidence to convict Davis of receiving stolen property. Fourth
we conclude that defense counsel failed to object on the record
to Balduck's testimony and therefore defendants' improper-testimony
argument is not properly before us. Moreover, even if the trial
court did err in admitting Bentley's testimony, the error was
harmless given the other evidence presented.9
9. Defendants also argue that the prosecutor committed
prosecutorial misconduct by misrepresenting to the court his
reasons for introducing Bentley and Balduck's testimony. In
support, defendants point to a post-trial statement by the
prosecutor to a newspaper reporter which allegedly evidenced his
ulterior motives for introducing the testimony. Defendants'
argument is without merit. First, we have already concluded
that, because defense counsel failed to object on the record to
Balduck's testimony, his testimony was properly admitted. Any
(continued...)
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In view of the number of charges and their nature; the
presence of multiple defendants; the factual complexity of the
case; and the failure of the parties in their briefs, or
otherwise on appeal, to delineate with any precision the impact
of partial suppression on particular counts, we remand to the
trial court to modify the judgments, as may be appropriate, in
accordance with the governing legal principles pronounced herein
--most particularly our suppression of all evidence recovered
from the Escort.

Gregory Jfi^ Orme, Judge

I CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

BENCH, Judge (concurring and dissenting):
I fully concur in the main opinion except for the section
entitled "Search of Hyatt's Escort." Defendants never argue that
the officers should not have searched the Escort because Davis
did not have common authority or control over it. Defendants
argue simply, "The fact that Davis was on probation is not cause
enough in which to search either Davis or Hyatt or any of their
belongings including vehicles and residence." I believe that the
main opinion inappropriately departs from basic principles of
appellate review when it decides the issue on grounds never urged
by defendants in their brief on appeal. See, e.g., American
Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical, Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1185
n.5 (Utah 1996) ("Issues not briefed by an appellant are deemed
waived and abandoned."); Bott v. Deland. 922 P.2d 732, 741 (Utah
1996) ("Where an appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the
point is waived."); State v. Vigil. 922 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah Ct.

9. (...continued)
prosecutorial motives related to the testimony's introduction are
therefore irrelevant--ulterior or not. Second, the prosecutor's
alleged statement was made post-trial to a newspaper reporter, is
not part of the record on appeal, and consequently is not before
us.

961271-CA

20

App. 1996) ("It is well settled that an appellate court is not
1
"a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden
of argument and research."'" (citations omitted)).
In any event, on the facts presented, the officers
reasonably believed that Davis had common authority or control
over the Escort. £££ Illinois v. Rodriqvez, 497 U.S. 177, 185,
110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990) ("[W]hat is generally demanded of
the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by
agents of the government . . . is not that they always be
correct, but that they always be reasonable."); see also Brinegar
v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949)
("Because many situations which confront officers in the course
of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must
be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes
must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly
to their conclusions of probability.").
I would therefore affirm the convictions entered by the
trial court.

Russell W. Bench, Juage *^
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ADDENDUM B

CSCOTT M BURNS (#4283)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suhe#l
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801)586-6694
Telecopier: (801)586-2737
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

)

vs.

)

BRADLEY C. DAVIS,
HOLLY H. HYATT,

)
)

Criminal Nos.

941501014
941501013
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court pursuant to a motion to suppress as
filed by the above-named Defendants on September 5,1995, and, thereafter, on October 3,1995, and
the above-named Defendants BRADLEY C. DAVIS and HOLLY H. HYATT having appeared on
both dates together with their attorney of record D. Bruce Oliver, and the State of Utah having
appeared on both dates by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Bums, and the Court having
received testimony and evidence both on September 5,1995, and October 3,1995, and the Court
having thereafter heard oral argumentsfromboth parties and having reviewed points and authorities
as submitted by the parties, and being fuOy advised in the premises now makes and enters the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, to wit:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that on November 21, 1994, Defendant Bradley C. Davis was on

probationfromthe Sixth District Court, State of Utah, and was being supervised by Adult Probation
and Parole agents in Cedar City, Utah (the location of the Defendant's residence), and that the
Defendant had consented, as a term and condition of a written probation order, to a search of his
residence, person, and property upon reasonable suspicion.
2.

The Courtfindsthat on November 20,1994, Mark Milby and Kelly Blackburn were

arrested in Washington County, State of Utah, after being stopped by a Hurricane City police officer.
In the vehicle occupied by Mr. Milby and Mr. Blackburn wasfreshblood and what appeared to be
deer hairs.

A subsequent investigation led to the arrest of Mr. Milby for possession of

methamphetamine and a citation being given to Mr. Blackburn for possession of drug paraphernalia.
Moreover, officers were investigating both individuals for a possible violation of unlawful taking of
protected wildlife. Officer Gary McKell, Division of Wildlife Resources, had knowledge that Kelly
Blackburn was not incarcerated after the initial arrest and, therefore, contacted law enforcement
officers in Iron County, State of Utah, and requested that an officer monitor the Mark Milby
residence located in Summit, Utah.
3.

The Court finds that at approximately 2:00 a.m. on November 21, 1994, Sergeant

Rick Evans of the Iron County SherifTs Department was parked at the Mark Milby residence,
pursuant to a requestfromOfficer McKeO, and observed a brown van approach the Milby residence,
begin to turn into the Milby driveway, and thereafter swerve away from the Milby residence and
accelerate away. Sergeant Evans followed the vehicle to the Summit Truck Stop and (a) observed
a male occupant exit the van, (b) identified the subject as Defendant Bradley C. Davis, and (c) asked
-2-

the Defendant what he was doing and receiving the reply, "Since my son died, I can't sleep," or
words to that affect. Mr. Davis was not seized, detained, or arrested at that time. Thereafter,
Sergeant Evans drove away and a vehicle passed him, believed to be driven by Kelly Blackburn, so
Sergeant Evans turned around and followed the vehicle back to the Summit Truck Stop where he
observed KeOy Blackburn, a person known to him, enter the Summit Truck Stop and meet with
Bradley C. Davis at a booth.
4.

The Courtfindsthat Aduh Probation and Parole Agents Rodney Seymour and Robert

Eckman were contacted later that day (November 21,1994) by Sergeant Evans and by Hurricane City
police officers and informed of the arrest and citation of Milby and Blackburn; the request that
Sergeant Evans monitor the Milby residence in Summit, Utah, and the fact that Defendant Bradley
C. Davis met with Kelly Blackburn at approximately 2:00 a.m. at the Summit Truck Stop.
5.

The Court finds that Adult Probation and Parole Agents Seymour and Eckman had

visited Defendant Bradley C. Davis9 residence approximately four (4) days prior to November 21,
1994, and located drug paraphernalia, a loadedfirearm,and further learned, by admissions from
Defendant Bradley C. Davis, that be had smoked marijuana and used methamphetamine within the
prior one (1) week.
6.

The Courtfindsthat, based upon the prior visit and search of approximately November

17,1994, as well as the information learned from Sergeant Rick Evans and Officer Gary McKell, as
well as Hurricane City police officers, Agents Seymour and Eckman made a determination to visit
the residence of Defendant Bradley C Davis on November 21, 1994, and conduct a search for
controlled substances and paraphernalia.
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7.

The Court finds that on November 21,1994, Agents Seymour and Eckman did, in

fact, travel to Defendant Bradley C. Davis1 residence and a subsequent search revealed numerous
hems of drug paraphernalia and controlled substances including the following, to wit: 13.5 grams of
marijuana; 510 milligrams of methamphetamine, 510 milligrams of methamphetamine; 520 milligrams
of methamphetamine; 1.7 grams of marijuana; 5.0 grams of marijuana; 990 milligrams of cocaine, 730
milligrams of cocaine, a glass pipe with cocaine residue; 2.9 grams of marijuana; 18.2 grams of
methamphetamine; drug paraphernalia; 5.2 grams of methamphetamine; 15.9 grams of marijuana;
portable scales; large scales; 382 grams of marijuana; 211 grams of marijuana, 198 grams of
marijuana; 195 grams of marijuana, 199 grams of marijuana; 135 grams of marijuana; 1,106 grams
of marijuana; and other hems of paraphernalia.
8.

The Court furtherfindsthat, within the Bradley C. Davis residence, Cedar City Police

Officer Jerry Womack observed a "black bag" that resembles a "bowling bag" located in a common
area of the residence. Officer Womack observed, in looking at the top of the bag, several hems with
the name "Bradley C. Davis" on said hems, including checks, bills, a letter, credit cards, etc., and
therefore made a search of the black bag

Inside the bag, Officer Womack located a baggie

containing methamphetamine, together with a red straw with methamphetamine residue and a metal
straw with methamphetamine residue. Officer Womack also located additional hems (credit cards,
drivers license, etc.) that belonged to "Holly Hyatt"; thereafter, Officer Womack made a
determination that the bag and purse, in all likelihood belonged to Defendant Holly H. Hyatt.
9.

The Court finds that Cedar City Police Officers Jerry Womack and Ken Stapley

gathered all of the evidence (as identified in paragraph 7 above) and transported said hems to the
Cedar Chy Police Department. Thereafter, Officers Womack and Stapley made notations of the items
-4-

seized, identifying each item and weighing some of the items, and thereafter placed the items in the
evidence locker.

Thereafter, Paula Douglas (evidence custodian of the Cedar City Police

Department) took custody of the items, placed them in a large box, and delivered them to Criminalist
John Gerlits at the Utah State Crime Lab located in Cedar City, Utah. Criminalist Gerlits marked,
tested, packaged, and, after analyzing each hem, returned said hems to Paula Douglas at the Cedar
Chy Police Department.
10.

The Courtfindsthat, pursuant to the search made by Agents Seymour and Eckman,

Cedar City Police Lieutenant Gen Miller arrived at the Defendant's residence and located several
toob (construction tools marked "United States Air Force," "UDOT," etc.) and took possession of
said tools under the assertion that said hems were stolen or had previously been reported as stolen
11.

The Court finds that Defendant Bradley C. Davis had access to and control of the

brown van (the van Defendant Davis was observed driving the previous night by Sergeant Evans)
and, moreover, Defendant Bradley C. Davis had access to and control of the blue Ford Escort vehicle,
the residence, and the "black bag" as previously identified herein.
12.

The Court finds that many of the items containing controlled substances (located

within the residence, the blue vehicle, and the van) are unique, easily identifiable, and include an
"Electrosol" bucket, a green backpack, and a white and blue striped diaper bag. The Court further
finds that there is no evidence of tampering with evidence, or destruction of evidence, by any of the
officers. The only evidence remotely relating to tampering was the testimony of Agent Eckman who
appeared to be confused, to some degree about the amount of marijuana in the "ElectrosoP bucket,
but his testimony did notriseto the level of supporting a theory that the evidence was tampered wit^
destroyed, or altered in any fashion.
-5-

13.

The Court finds that Defendant Holly H. Hyatt has resided with Defendant Bradley

C. Davis at the residence searchedforapproximately two and one-half (2 V4) years and that Defendant
Holly H. Hyatt had knowledge that the Defendant was on probation and, as a term of his probation,
he had consented to a search of his person, property, and vehicles. The Court further finds that many
of the hems located (controlled substances and paraphernalia) were found in common areas of the
residence as well as in two (2) vehicles parked near the residence that both Defendants had access
to, and control over.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant Bradley C. Davis was on probation, having been convicted of a crime which

extinguished previously enjoyed constitutionally protected liberty interests for the time that he was
under the jurisdiction of the Sixth District Court. Pennitting offenders to serve all or part of their
sentences in the community, rather than in prison or jail, places a far greater burden on the State to
protect public safety and provide sufficient structure to aid in treatment efforts. To meet the difficult
responsibility of supervising offenders in the community, courts have held that it is reasonable to
allow frequent searches of offenders and to permit the searches on a more relaxed standard.
Probation searches further the legitimate penalogical interests by disarming offenders who cany
weapons, providing greater protection to agents and other officers supervising or arresting offenders,
and discovering contraband or other evidence of violations of release agreements and/or the law.
Probable cause requirements, therefore, do not generally apply to probation and parole searches. The
Fourth Amendment protects probationers only "against unreasonable searches and seizures."
2.

A state's operation of a probation system, like its operation of a prison or jail, presents

"special needs" beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departuresfromthe normal warrant
•6-

and probable cause requirement. Probation, like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction imposed
by a court upon an offender after a verdict of guilt or a plea of guilt. Supervision, therefore, is a
"special need" of the state permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be
constitutional if applied to the public at large.
3.

Hie Fourth Amendment requirement for searches are reduced for probationers as it

is the very assumption of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation
and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law. The Fourth Amendment requirement
for searches of probationers is aan articulable reasonable suspicion" State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d
1069, 1072 (Utah 1987). In Johnson, the Court held that "a parole officer may conduct a lawful
search of a parolee's apartment without a search warrant if the parole officer has a 'reasonable
ground for investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of his parole or committed a
crime.m It is necessary that a parole officer have an articulable "reasonable suspicion" which requires
no more than that the agent be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a belief... that a condition of parole has
been or is being violated. State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1987) quoting State v.
Valasquezi 672 P.2d 1254,1260 (1983); and U.S. v. Scott 678 F.2d 32, 35 (CA5 1982). For the
legal development of the reasonable suspicion standard, K£ Tenv v. Ohio. J92 USl (1968); Adams
v. Williams. 407 US143 (1972); and United States v. Bripnoni-Poncg. 422 US873 (1975).
Several factors may be considered in determining whether there are reasonable grounds,
including but not limited to: (1) information provided by an informant, s& State v. Valasqucz. supra,
(2) reliability and specificity of the information, firfffin y, Wj^nfiin, 483 US868 (1987); (3)
reliability of the informant, sss Griffin v. Wisconsin, supra, (4) the probation/parole officer's
•7-

experience with, and knowledge o£ the offender, && Qriffin v WJSf^P^ supra, and (5) the need
to verify compliance with the requirements of the conditional release agreement, jfifi Griffin v.

Wisconsin supra.
4.

Agents Rodney Seymour and Robert Eckman had reasonable suspicion, on November

21, 1994, to believe that Defendant Bradley C. Davis was possessing controlled substances or
paraphernalia, and likewise had reasonable suspicion to believe that the Defendant was violating the
terms of his conditional release.
5.

Defendant Bradley C. Davis was on probation and had consented to a search of his

residence, property, and person upon reasonable suspicion.
6.

Holly H. Hyatt had a reduced "expectation of privacy" to the subject residence,

vehicles, and property located within common areas as co-Defendant Bradley C. Davis was on
probation.
7.

Holly H. Hyatt did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to the "black bag"

until after Officer Womack had made a determination that the bag belonged to Holly H. Hyatt.
8.

Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that a condition precedent, as relating to

the introduction of evidence, is satisfied if the evidence is "what its proponent claims it is." While
Cedar City police officers should have marked the evidence, the fact that they did not mark each item
does not make the evidence inadmissible.
9.

The evidence at issue was not subject to tampering, destruction, or alteration requiring

a suppression of said evidence.
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10.

All of the evidence, previously described herein, is admissible with the exception of

any hems located in the "black bag" after Officer Womack determined that the "black bag" belonged
to Holly H. Hyatt as opposed to Bradley C. Davis.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to suppress,
asfiledindependently by Defendant Holly H. Hyatt and Defendant Bradley C. Davis, should be, and
hereby is, overruled and denied.

IS***

DATED this _^_l_Tday of October, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

IP EVES
District Court
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, byfirst-classmail, postage fully
prepaid, on this

day of October, 1995, to the following, to wit:
Mr. D. Bruce Oliver, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants
180 South 300 West #210
SaJiLakeChy, UT S4J0J

ksMii

Secretary
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